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Abstract
With the increase in the military and several other applications of Wireless Sensor
Network, provisions must be made for secure transmission of sensitive information
throughout the network. Most of the routing protocols proposed for ad-hoc networks
and sensor networks are not designed with security as a goal. Hence, many routing
protocols are vulnerable to an attack by an adversary who can disrupt the network or
harness valuable information from the network. Routing Protocols for wireless sensor
networks are classified into three types depending on their network structure as Flat
routing protocols, Hierarchical routing protocol and Geographic routing protocols.
Large number of nodes in a wireless sensor network , limited battery power and their
data centric nature make routing in wireless sensor network a challenging problem.
We mainly concentrate on location-based or geographic routing protocol like Greedy
Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol. Sybil attack and Selective forwarding attack
are the two attacks feasible in GPSR. These attacks are implemented in GPSR and
their losses caused to the network are analysed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Wireless Sensor Network
Wireless Sensor Networks(WSN) is an interconnection of a large number of nodes
deployed for monitoring the environment or system by means of measurement of
environmental parameters like temperature, pressure, humidity. Some of the military
applications of sensor networks are battle field surveillance and detection of attack by
weapons of mass destruction. Sensor networks can also be effectively used for forest
fire detection, flood detection, and monitoring habitats of animal’s .Sensor networks
are usually deployed in the conditions where continuous human intervention is not
possible. Hence the set-up and maintenance of sensor networks should be autonomous.
Sensor networks should also be adaptable to changing connectivity due to failure of
node or introduction of new nodes. Sensor nodes being highly energy constrained
pose serious challenges to the maintenance of highly scalable robust wireless network.
Most of the routing protocols proposed for ad hoc networks and sensor networks are
not designed with security as a goal. Hence many protocols are vulnerable to an
attack by an adversary to breach the network or harness valuable information from
the network.
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1.2 Architecture for Nodes in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
The nodes have to meet the requirement of a specific application. They should be
small cheap, portable and energy efficient.
The basic components of a node[12] are
• Sensor and actuator - an interface to the physical world designed to sense the
environmental parameters like pressure and temperature.
• Controller - is to control different modes of operation for processing of data
• Memory - storage for programming data.
• Communication - a device like antenna for sending and receiving data over a
wireless channel.
• Power Supply- supply of energy for smooth operation of a node like battery.
Figure 1.1: Single Node Architecture
The power supply to the node is limited .hence the design of protocols should be
such that minimum energy is required for communication of information. The energy
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conservation of nodes can be achieved by introducing and using multiple states of
operation with reduced energy consumption in return for reduced functionality. For a
controller typically three states of operations can be used active, idle and sleep .The
choice of operational stage should be made on basis of time for external stimuli so
that the transitions between various states should be optimal as transitions between
states take time and energy.
1.3 Challenges in Routing for Wireless Sensor Net-
works
Low power ,limited bandwidth ,limited energy supply are main problems to be en-
countered in design of Wireless Sensor Networks . Main aim is to carry out data
communication and prevent degradation by energy management techniques to pro-
long the lifetime of network.
Some routing challenges[9] are
1. Node deployment can be deterministic or randomized. In deterministic , sensor
nodes are placed manually in a predefined path unlike randomized where, if the
resultant distribution is not uniform, optimal clustering becomes necessary for
connectivity.
2. Energy consumption without losing accuracy: In multi-hop wireless sensor net-
work each node performs dual activity - data sender and a data router[12].The
malfunctioning of some nodes due to power failure can lead to topological
changes and again re-routing of packets can lead to energy and power failure
and lead to energy and power loss.
3. Data reporting model: It can be event driven, query driven and time driven.
Time driven is used for periodic data monitoring .Sensor switch on sensor nodes
periodically and sense data and transmit the sensed data. In event driven if
some drastic change in value of the sensed attribute event occurs in environment
sensor nodes sense it and transmits.
4. Heterogeneity : Some sensor nodes differ in their technical design due to appli-
cation orientation, data routing or communication becomes little problem due
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to technical issues because sensing rate is different for different sensors.
5. Data Centricity: In Wireless Sensor Network multiple nodes are deployed to
report an event for redundancy. The identity of the nodes providing data is not
of much concern as compared to data supporting the occurrence of that event.
Due to the presence of large number of nodes in a wireless sensor network it is
not possible to assign a global identifier to each node.This networking approach
is called data centric networking.
6. Scalability: A large number of sensor nodes should be deployed in sensing area.
A routing scheme must be able to work with these huge number of sensor nodes.
After data routing it should go to sleep state.
7. Fault tolerance: Failure of certain nodes due to power will effect the overall
routing scheme. So formation of new links should be accomplished for routing
of data to base stations. Re-routing of packets through network requires more
energy.
8. Coverage : Wireless Sensor Networks must be deployed in a large area to ensure
more accuracy of the events occurring in the environment.
1.4 Applications of Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks are used in many applications[13] such as
1. Military and civil applications such as target field imaging.
2. Weather monitoring and tactical surveillance.
3. Detecting ambient conditions such as temperature , movement, sound, light or
the presence of certain objects.
4. They are used for disaster management.(Here a large number of sensor nodes are
dropped from helicopter. So that it can be used for finding survivors, Identifying
risk areas and making the rescue team more aware of the overall situation in
the disaster area) .
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1.5 Motivation and Challenges
The development of wireless sensor networks was motivated by military applications
such as battlefield surveillance; today such networks are used in many industrial
and consumer application, such as industrial process monitoring and control, ma-
chine health monitoring, environment and habitat monitoring, healthcare applica-
tions, home automation, and traffic control. Routing Protocols for wireless sensor
networks should address challenges like lifetime maximization, robustness , fault tol-
erance and self-configuration properties of nodes. With wide range of applications
,designing a routing protocol that caters to the needs of wireless sensor networks as
well as providing security of data have become an active research area in computer
science. Integrating a new routing protocol in QualNet and simulation of attacks over
GPSR and their analysis are some of the challenges encountered during the project.
1.6 Problem Statement
To implement Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing protocol for Wireless Sensor Net-
work, identify the attacks feasible, simulate and analyse selective forwarding attack
and sybil attack over GPSR.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Classification of Routing Protocols
Routing protocols[9] are responsible for routing data packets from source node to the
destination node. Along with routing ,the protocol aims to meet the requirements and
challenges faced by the wireless sensor network. A routing protocol for wireless sensor
network should be scalable for large number of nodes and exhibit characteristics like
fault tolerance for reliability, energy efficiency for prolonged network lifetime and data
centric.
2.1.1 Behavioural classification of Routing Protocols
Depending on the behaviour for establishment of paths from source to destination
routing protocols can be classified as proactive, reactive, hybrid [9]. In Proactive rout-
ing protocol routes are predetermined. Reactive routing protocols are event driven
the routes are determined on demand basis. Hybrid routing protocol is a combination
of both reactive and proactive routing protocol to enhance network performance.
2.1.2 Network structure based Routing Protocols
Routing protocols can also be classified on the basis of network structure as Flat
Network Routing, Hierarchical Network Routing and Location based routing[9].
14
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Figure 2.1: Classification of Routing Protocols
Flat Network Routing
A flat network structure is the one in which all the nodes have the same responsibility
for routing of data. The contribution of nodes for routing data packets through out
the network is similar. Flat routing protocols[9] are multi hop routing protocols .Due
to large number of nodes in a wireless sensor network, assignment of global identifier
to each node is not possible. Thus the routing should be data centric where base sta-
tions send queries to certain regions and waits for the data from the sensors deployed
at selected region. Regions are areas in a network in whose vicinity some event occurs
[9].
It is of various types such as
1. SPIN(Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation)[14]
2. Directed Diffusion[24]
3. Rumor Routing[25]
4. MCFA( Minimum Cost Forwarding Algorithm)[26]
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5. Gradient Based Routing(GBR)[27]
6. COUGAR[28]
7. IDSQ(Information driven sensor querying) and CADR(Constrained Anisotropic
diffusion routing)[29]
8. ACQUIRE(Active Query Forwarding In sensor Networks)[30]
9. Energy Aware Routing[31]
Hierarchical Network Routing
Hierarchical routing protocol[9] is also called as cluster based routing protocol. Ini-
tially it has been proposed for wire line networks. Hierarchical routing protocols also
meet the requirement of energy efficiency in wireless sensor networks. In cluster based
routing protocol high energy nodes are used for purpose such as sending and process-
ing of data packets while low energy nodes are used for sensing of data from the
target area .The process of creation of clusters and assignment of task to these cluster
heads can result in scalability of overall system, prolonged lifetime, energy efficiency
.Cluster based routing is used to initiate data aggregation ,reduction of data packets
sent to the base station, lowering the energy consumption of nodes used in a wireless
sensor network. This routing protocol consists of techniques meeting the needs of a
network such as scalability[9] and efficient communication.
Hierarchical routing protocol can be of various types:
1. LEACH Protocol[14]
2. Power-Efficient Gathering in Sensor Information Systems (PEGASIS)[15]
3. Threshold-sensitive Energy Efficient Protocols (TEEN[16] and APTEEN[17])
4. Small Minimum Energy Communication Network (MECN)[18]
5. Self Organizing Protocol (SOP)[19]
6. Sensor Aggregates Routing[20]
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7. Virtual Grid Architecture routing (VGA)[21]
8. Hierarchical Power-aware Routing (HPAR)[22]
9. Two-Tier Data Dissemination (TTDD)[23]
Location based Routing
In location based routing[9] data packets are routed towards the destination by us-
ing the geographic location of nodes. Sensor nodes are addressed by means of their
location. These class of routing protocols are highly scalable and energy efficient as
they basically leverage on the location information of the nodes which can be easily
obtained by exchanging the co-ordinates of nodes. The location of nodes may also
be directly available by directly communicating with the satellite, using GPS (Global
Positioning System), if nodes are equipped with a small and low power GPS receiver.
The location based or geographic routing protocols can be effectively used in a wire-
less sensor network consisting of very large number of nodes to find the routes without
much consumption of energy [9]. Thus geographic routing protocols meet the scala-
bility and energy requirements of wireless sensor network.
Geographic routing protocols are of various types :
1. GPSR(Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol)[1]
2. Geographic Adaptive Fidelity(GAF)[2]
3. GEAR(Geographic Energy Aware Routing)[11]
4. GOAFR(The Greedy Other Adaptive Face Routing)[3]
5. MFR, DIR and GEDIR[4]
GPSR(Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol)
GPSR[1] is a geographic routing protocol which selects the next node which is ge-
ographically closest to the destination. This packet forwarding technique is called
Greedy forwarding. This may lead to a situation when all the neighbouring nodes
are away from the destination than the current node through which packet is to be
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routed. Such regions in a network are called voids. The packet then needs to be
routed along the perimeter of the void. This packet forwarding technique is called
Perimeter forwarding. Thus, GPSR uses a combination of greedy and perimeter for-
warding technique to route data towards the destination. GPSR forms the core of
our research and is explained in detail in chapter 3.
Chapter 3
GPSR and feasible attacks
Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR)[1] is a geographic or location based rout-
ing protocol that uses the geographic positions of routers and packets destination to
make packet forwarding decision.Shortest-path algorithms are state proportional to
the number of hops away from destinations whereas, GPSR is a stateless protocol
as it does not require the overall topology of the network to be maintained rather
it depends only on local topology maintained by every node. Each node in a sensor
network keeps track of the location of its immediate neighbours by using a simple
beaconing algorithm. Periodically each node transmits a beacon to its immediate
neighbours on the broadcast MAC address containing its own identifier and position.
The inter beacon transmission interval is uniformly distributed in the interval [0.5B,
1.5B] to keep up the most current positions of the neighbours . While not receiving
any beacon from a particular neighbour for longer period of time which is greater than
time-out interval T, the GPSR router assumes that the neighbour has failed or gone
out of range and deletes that neighbour from its table.In GPSR each node needs the
propagation of topology information for all those nodes which are single hop distance.
Thus the state required is minimum[1].
As the name suggests GPSR routes the data packets in greedy mode. Greedy for-
warding is used throughout the network whenever possible but in the regions where
greedy forwarding fails to route packet further towards the destination, the packet is
temporarily transmitted in the perimeter mode.
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3.1 Greedy Forwarding
To forward a packet to its neighbour a source must know the geographic location of
the destination. This information can be obtained by a location server like GPS. A
packet can then be routed towards the destination in the greedy mode. In a greedy
mode a node selects the next node as that neighbour which is geographically closest
to the destination. Thus, it selects a locally optimal node as the next hope till it can
find such neighbour or until the destination is reached. Consider an example shown
in Figure. 3.1 . In the given figure , x receives a packet which is to be destined[1] for
D . x ’s radio range is represented by a thin lined circle which is centred at x,and the
radius of the arc is equal to the distance between y and D is shown as the thin lined
arc about D . Among all its neighbours x forwards packets to y , because the distance
between y and D is actually less than that of between D and any node of the x ’s
neighbour[1]. Greedy forwarding has a great advantage as it rely only on knowledge
Figure 3.1: Greedy forwarding example
of the forwarding node’s immediate neighbours. Thus the state required is negligible
and the amount of memory and the processing in the sensor network is considerably
saved. Thus GPSR[1] can save much amount of energy and can scale to large number
of nodes in Wireless Sensor Network.
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3.2 Perimeter Mode
The greedy forwarding technique to route using only the position of neighbour nodes
comes with one limitation: there may be topologies which requires a data packet to
move temporarily away from the destination. A simple example of such topology is
shown in Figure 3.2. In this case, x is closer to D as compared to its neighbours
Figure 3.2: Greedy forwarding failure, x is a local minimum in its geographic prox-
imity to D ,w and y are farther from D
w and y . Again the thin lined arc about D has a radius equal as compared to the
distance between x and D . Thus, there is no node neighbouring x whose distance
to D is less than the distance between x and D . This is represented by a void as
shown in Figure.3.3. Now there exist two paths via w and via y through which x can
route packet towards D . Hence, x has to shift the packet temporarily away from the
destination. x then selects the next node according to the right hand rule and the
packet follows the path along the perimeter of the void towards the destination and
the packet is said to enter into the perimeter mode[1].
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Figure 3.3: Node x ’s void with respect to destination D
3.3 Right Hand Rule
The right hand rule in graphs is used to route the packet whenever the packet en-
counters a void. Thus right hand rule says that when arriving at node x from node
y , the next edge traversed will be the next sequential counter-clockwise about y the
edge (x,y). This rule traverses the interior of a closed polygonal region in a clockwise
order as shown in Figure 3.4. the triangle bounded by the edges between nodes x , y ,
and z , in the order (y → x→ z → y). This rule also traverses an exterior region, as
described in this case in counter-clockwise edge order[1].
Unfortunately, the right-hand rule does not yield a traversal of the perimeter of a
closed polygon on all wireless network graphs. On graphs with edges that cross, the
right-hand rule may instead take a degenerate tour of edges that does not trace the
boundary of a closed polygon. Such graphs with crossing edges are known as non-
planar graphs. An example of a non-planar graph appears in Figure 3.5. Here, when
x originates a packet to u , the right-hand rule results in the tour (x → u → z →
w → u → x). The no-crossing heuristic: if, during traversal of a graph by the right
hand rule, the candidate next edge crosses an edge taken earlier in the traversal, that
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Figure 3.4: Right Hand Rule Traversal for a polygon
Figure 3.5: A network with crossing edges. The right-hand rule gives the tour (x →
u→ z → w → u→ x)
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candidate next edge is ignored, and the next edge in counter-clockwise order is taken,
instead. The purpose of this heuristic is to remove crossing edges from the graph, so
that the right-hand rule takes the intended tour. In the case of Figure 3.5, starting
from x , after taking the path (x → u → z), the no-crossing heuristic ignores edge
(z, w) at z , because it crosses the previously taken edge (x, u) the graph, the heuristic
has the desired effect: the complete clockwise outer edge tour (x→ u→ z → v → x).
This heuristic traverses all the nodes along the perimeter of void and helps route
packets to the destination[1].
3.4 Planarized Graphs
Planarized graphs are used to remove cross links in the network. A graph is said
to be planar if no two edges cross.The Relative Neighbourhood Graph (RNG) and
Gabriel Graph (GG)[1] are two long known planar graphs. The RNG or GG algorithm
yields a network with no cross edges or crossing links. However for this scheme to be
successful ,removal of cross edges from graph to reduce it to the RNG or GG must be
done and also it must not produce disconnection in the graph, because this may lead
to partitioning of the network[1].
3.4.1 Relative Neighbourhood Graph(RNG)
The RNG is defined as follows: An edge (u, v) will exist between the vertices of u and
v, if the distance between d(u, v) is always less than or equal to the distance between
the vertex w, and whichever among u and v is farther away from v. In equational
form[1]: ∀w 6= u, v : d(u, v) < max[d(u,w), d(v, w)]
Figure 3.6 depicts the rule for constructing RNG. The shaded region drawn be-
tween u and v, must be empty and any of presence of node w for (u, v) has to be
included in the RNG. The boundary of the lune can be stated as the intersection of
the circles passing about u and v of radius d(u, v).
3.4.2 Gabriel Graph(GG)
The Gabrie Graph[1] is defined as follows – An edge (u,v) may exist between vertices
u and v if no other vertex w is present within the circle whose diameter is uv. In
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Figure 3.6: The RNG graph. for edge (u, v) to be included, the shaded lune must
contain no witness w.
equational form[1]: ∀w 6= u, v : d2(u, v) ≤ [d2(u,w) + d2(v, w)]
Figure 3.7: The GG graph
Figure 3.10 depicts the rule for constructing GG. As the midpoint of uv is the
centre of the circle with diameter uv, a node can remove its non GG links from a full
neighbourhood list N.
Both these algorithms for rendering the graph of the radio network planar take time
O(deg2) at each node, where deg is the node’s degree in the full radio graph. It has
been shown in the literature that the RNG is a subset of the GG. This is consistent
with the smaller shaded region searched for a witness in the GG, as compared with in
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the RNG. Figure 3.10 shows a full unit graph corresponding to 200 nodes randomly
placed on a 2000-by-2000-meter region, with radio ranges of 250 meters; the GG
subset of the full graph; and the RNG subset of the full graph[1].
Figure 3.8: Left: the full graph of a radio network. 200 nodes, uniformly randomly
placed on a 2000 x 2000 meter region, with a radio range of 250 m. Center: the GG
subset of the full graph. Right: the RNG subset of the full and GG graphs
The full Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing algorithm combines greedy forward-
ing on the full network graph with perimeter forwarding on the planarized network
graph where greedy forwarding is not possible[1].
3.5 Attacks on Geographical Routing Protocols
Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol is robust and efficient for the applica-
tions of Wireless Sensor Network but it was not designed with security as a goal.
The broadcast nature of communication along with the stringent energy constraints
prove maleficent for the security in wireless sensor network. The attacks in sensor
networks can be mainly distinguished as outsider attacks and the insider attacks. In
outsider attack the attacker has no special access to the sensor network whereas in
an insider attack the attacker can access the sensor network and model an attack by
using compromised node to run malicious code or by using stolen key material, code
and data from legitimate nodes. GPSR, is susceptible to three major attacks[5] as
described below
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3.5.1 Selective Forwarding Attack
In a wireless sensor network some nodes may drop all the packets received for routing
to the destination. Such malicious nodes can be easily detected and inferred as the
absence of the link. So an alternate link can be found through which packets can be
routed thus, keeping the loss of packets under control. A more subtle form of attack is
realized when an adversary does not drop all the packets but selectively forwards few
packets while dropping all the other packets. Such packet selection by an adversary
is very difficult to detect and can cause considerable loss of packets in the network
which may go undetected and eventually resulting in substantial loss of information.
Selective forwarding[5] can cause no reporting or late reporting of an even in Wireless
Sensor Network. We have simulated selective forwarding attack on GPSR for wireless
sensor network and measured the loss incurred by the network.
3.5.2 Sybil Attack
Sybil attack[5] was first proposed by J. R. Douceur. In a Sybil attack[5] an adversary
node presents multiple identities to other nodes in the network to use the services
offered by the network. In wireless sensor network Sybil attack can greatly affect
the effectiveness of the fault-tolerance schemes. Geographic routing protocols such as
Figure 3.9: Sybil attack against geographic routing protocol
GPSR are highly susceptible to Sybil attack[5] as the identity of the nodes is related
with their geographic location which can be falsely advertised. In GPSR for wireless
sensor network the nodes exchange their own and also their other neighbour’s location
coordinates with their neighbouring nodes by sending beacons at regular intervals. An
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adversary node in a network can initiate the Sybil attack by sending false location
information. Thus an adversary may claim to be present at more than one location
to its neighbours by sending multiple beacons, each time with a different location
information as shown in Figure 3.9. Here an adversary node A, sends four different
locations to node B. Thus node B is forced to send packet to node A which is actually
farther from the node C to which it eventually wants to send the packet[5]. An
Figure 3.10: Routing loops in GPSR
adversary can also form routing loops[5] as shown in Figure 3.10 by exchanging the
false location of the neighbour. As shown in Figure 3.10 an adversary node A sends
false location of its neighbour B to the node C which wants to send the packet to
destination D. After receiving the location of node B through A, node C sends the
packet back to B as it is convinced of the location of B to be near the destination.
This results into the formation of routing loops which may render the network useless
by looping the packets and not routing packets to the destination. We have selected
a few nods as Sybil nodes in our simulation to illustrate the effects of Sybil attack
over wireless sensor network[5].
3.5.3 Spoofed or Bogus Routing
This is the most common type of attack which can take place in Geographic Routing
Protocol. Main motive of this attack is to change or modify or alter the routing
information which are commonly exchanged between two neighbour nodes. Thus this
attack is also known as spoofed, altered or replayed routing. By spoofing or changing
the routing information adversaries becomes capable of creating routing loops or it
can attract network traffic or it can repel network traffic. It may extend or shorten
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the routing sources or it can produce false error messages .Spoofed or bogus routing
may also lead to increment of end to end latency and partitioning of network[5].
Chapter 4
Literature Survey
4.1 Defences against Sybil attacks
To defend against the Sybil attack, we would like to validate that each node identity
is the only identity presented by the corresponding physical node. There are two
types of ways to validate an identity. The first type is direct validation, in which a
node directly tests whether another node identity is valid. The second type is indirect
validation, in which nodes that have already been verified are allowed to vouch for or
refute other nodes[7].
4.1.1 Radio Resource Testing
As a form of resource testing, this approach relies on the assumption that any physical
device has only one radio[7]. We also assume that a radio is incapable of simultane-
ously sending or receiving on more than one channel. Consider that a node wants
to verify that none of its neighbours are Sybil identities. It can assign each of its n
neighbours a different channel to broadcast some message on. It can then choose a
channel randomly on which to listen. If the neighbour that was assigned that channel
is legitimate, it should hear the message. Suppose that s of the verifier’s n neighbours
are actually Sybil nodes. In that case, the probability of choosing to listen to a channel
that is not being transmitted on, and thus detecting a Sybil node, is s
n
. Conversely,
the probability of not detecting a Sybil node is n−s
n
. If the test is repeated for r
rounds, then the chance of no Sybil nodes being detected is (n−s
n
)r Figure 5.1 shows
the probability of not detecting the presence of some Sybil nodes using this method.
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A more difficult case is when there are not enough channels to assign each neigh-
bour a different channel. In this case, a node can only test some subset of its neigh-
bours at one time. If there arec channels, then the node can test c neighbours at once.
Note that a malicious node not in the subset being tested can cover for a Sybil node
that is being tested by transmitting on the channel that the Sybil node is supposed
to be transmitting on. Suppose that in a node’s set of n neighbours, there are s Sybil
nodes, m malicious nodes, and g good (correct) nodes. Of these, a node can only
test c neighbours at one time. Of these c neighbours, there are S Sybil nodes, M
malicious nodes, and G good (correct) nodes. The probability of a Sybil node being
detected[7] is then
Now suppose that we repeat this test for r rounds, choosing a random subset to
test and a random channel to listen to in each round. The probability of a Sybil node
being detected[7] is then
This is an effective defence against the simultaneous direct-communication variant
of the Sybil attack, if the assumptions hold that an attacker cannot use one device to
send on multiple channels simultaneously.
4.1.2 Random key pre distribution
Eschenauer and Gligor first proposed a random key pre distribution scheme [6]. The
random key pre distribution technique allow nodes to establish a shared key with
other nodes. Thus, these techniques allow nodes to establish secure links to other
nodes. Random key distribution schemes can also be used to defend against the Sybil
attack by node validation.
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE SURVEY 32
4.2 Defence against Selective forwarding attack
The multi-data flow topologies (MDT)[32] is a technique that defends against the
selective forwarding attack. This technique leads to detection of selective forwarding
attack as well as identification of the malicious sensor nodes. In this concept, both base
station and sensor nodes share the responsibility for defending against the selective
forwarding attack.
4.2.1 Multi-Data flow Topologies scheme
The MDT scheme is proposed to defend against the selective forwarding attack.The
main ideas in the MDT scheme[32] can be described as follows:
• Base station divides sensor nodes into various groups before deployment.
• Each group of nodes constitutes a single data flow topology.
• Sensor nodes sent packets containing some secrets and routing information
• After deployment, multi-data flow topologies are build by sensors.
• Each sensor node belonging to one data flow topology can only communicate
with the sensor nodes of the same topology
• After creation of multi-data flow topologies, each sensor node senses around
itself and sends the sensed information to the base station
• WSN allows each sensor node to randomly choose the topology number.
In selective forwarding attack , malicious node drops some data packets and hence
the base station does not obtain all the packets from the source node. But the Base
station can recover all the lost data packets from other data flow topologies. It can be
explained with an example. Suppose the whole sensing area is divided into 2 different
topologies. In one topology if a malicious node exists then it will drop some packets
and the base station will receive reduced number of packets , but simultaneously the
base station also receives original data packets from other topologies. Hence the base
station can identify the malicious node.
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Locating the Faulty Sensor nodes
In wireless sensor network, the entire area is divided into smaller regions. At the time
of deployment sensor are deployed in various regions. Although the base station may
not be knowing the exact location of of nodes ,this concept assumes that the base
station is aware of location of nodes in various regions. When the base station receives
reduced number of packet from a region it marks all the nodes that region. Now base
station can analyse the various regions from the data collected and can identify the
malicious node.
Advantages
1. The base station receives information continuously by sensing from sensor nodes
even though selective forwarding attack is active.
2. MDT scheme[32] is lightweight as well as simple too . There is no need for sensor
nodes to take much effort for detection and identification of the malicious sensor
nodes.
3. There is no need of resending the dropped packets after detection of malicious
sensor nodes.
Disadvantages
1. The first drawback is lack of efficiency. Sensor nodes have to take much effort
for detection of selective forwarding attack.
2. The second drawback is security problem. This scheme cannot detect the attack
successfully in some particular condition.
3. This scheme only considers the selective forwarding attack.
4. This scheme detects some packets are dropped and identifies the possible ma-
licious sensor nodes, the sensor node will need to obtain other routing paths




QualNet[10] is a comprehensive suite of tools for modelling large wired and wireless
networks provided by Scalable Network Technologies. It uses simulation and emula-





We have simulated Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing Protocol (GPSR)[8] in Qual-
Net5.0.2. Further we have implemented Selective forwarding attack and Sybil attack
over GPSR to analyse the losses incurred by the wireless sensor network. The results
obtained from simulation of GPSR help us to measure the loss caused by the attacks.
5.1 Simulation of GPSR
A Wireless sensor network consisting of 17 nodes is used for simulation. Node 15
acts a source or CBR client and Node 9 acts as a destination or CBR server. All the
nodes are set to use GPSR as a routing protocol. An event has occurred near node
15 which acts as a source and the event has to be reported to node 9 which acts as a
base station. A sample scenario for simulation of GPSR is shown in Figure 5.1.
To find the coordinates of neighbouring nodes, each node sends beacons at regular
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Figure 5.1: Sample scenario for GPSR
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intervals. A beacon packet consists of the location of the node sending the beacon as
well as their neighbours location. The total number of beacon sent during simulation
by each node is 68.A node can receive beacons from more than one neighbour. Total
number of beacons sent and received during simulation is shown in figure 5.2 for each
node.
Figure 5.2: Total number of beacons sent and received
Once the location of neighbouring nodes are known packets can be routed towards
the destination in greedy mode. As shown in figure 5.3 , the number of greedy forwards
by nodes 2, 5, 14 and 15 are maximum as their respective neighbours are closer to
the destination.
Conversely, as shown in Figure 5.4 , nodes 9,10,14 have their respective neighbours
farther from the destination. Thus they have maximum perimeter forwards. Greedy
forwards and perimeter forwards are the number of packets forwarded by nodes in
greedy and perimeter modes respectively.
As the packets are routed towards the destination they are switched from greedy mode
to perimeter mode when they encounter a void and switch back to the greedy mode
after covering the void several times until destination is reached. Figure 5.5 shows the
number of packets switched from greedy mode to perimeter mode whereas Figure 5.6
shows the number of packets switched back from perimeter mode to greedy mode.
In the simulation the number of packet dropped for each node is measured to be
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Figure 5.3: GPSR greedy forwards
Figure 5.4: GPSR perimeter forwards
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Figure 5.5: Number of packets switched from greedy to perimeter mode
Figure 5.6: Number of packets switched from perimeter to greedy mode
zero.
5.2 Selective forwarding attack over GPSR
The example scenario of section 5.1 is used to implement selective forwarding attack
over GPSR. In our sample scenario we have selected node 4,7 and 10 as malicious
nodes to launch selective forwarding attack over GPSR ,as shown in Figure 5.7.
The selective forwarding attack does not alter the number of beacons sent and
beacons received .Thus the total number of beacons sent and beacons received remains
same as in GPSR as inferred from the figure 5.8. Similarly, selective forwarding attack
does not much alter the greedy forwards and the perimeter forwards of the nodes .
The smaller variation can be observed from figure 5.9, 5.10 ,5.11,5.12 which is caused
to cope the number of packets lost in the routing path. The number of greedy forwards
for node 11 and node 13 were 0 each in GPSR whereas in implementation of selective
forwarding attack over GPSR it is found to be increased by 1 each as shown in figure
5.9.
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Figure 5.7: Sample scenario with Selective Forwarding Attack
Figure 5.8: Beacon sent and Beacon received for Selective Forwarding Attack
CHAPTER 5. SIMULATION RESULTS 40
Figure 5.9: Number of greedy forwards in GPSR with Selective Forwarding Attack
Figure 5.10: Number of perimeter forwards in GPSR with Selective Forwarding Attack
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Figure 5.11: Number Of packets switched from greedy to perimeter mode in GPSR
with Selective Forwarding Attack
Figure 5.12: Number of packets switched from perimeter to greedy mode in GPSR
with Selective Forwarding Attack
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Figure 5.13: Number of dropped packets in GPSR with Selective Forwarding Attack
The malicious nodes now drop most of the packets received and selectively forward
the packet. As can be seen from figure 5.13 the number of packet dropped for node 4
and node 10 is very high as compared to GPSR. Node 7 being a malicious node has
zero number of packet dropped as packets are not routed through node 7. The loss
of packets may lead to loss of an event being reported to the destination.
5.3 Sybil attack over GPSR
The example scenario of section 5.1 is used to implement Sybil attack over GPSR. In
our sample scenario we have selected node 1, 3 and 14 as malicious nodes to launch
Sybil attack over GPSR ,as shown in Figure 5.14.
Sybil attack is launched by the malicious nodes by sending more number of bea-
cons than the normal nodes to falsely advertise multiple locations. In our case each
malicious node advertises four more false locations. Thus the number of beacons sent
for Sybil nodes are approximately four times the normal nodes as can be seen from
Figure 5.15. This results in increase in the number of beacons received by other nodes
and the number of fake identities in the network.
The Sybil attack alters the number of beacons sent and beacons received .Thus the
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Figure 5.14: Sample scenario with Sybil attack over GPSR
Figure 5.15: Beacon sent and Beacon received for Sybil attack over GPSR
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total changed number of beacons sent and beacons received leads to small variations
in network in terms of greedy forwards , perimeter forwards etc..The smaller variation
can be observed from figure 5.16, 5.17 ,5.18 ,5.19 which is caused to cope the changed
number of beacons and advertisement of multiple locations of a Sybil node in the
routing path. The number of greedy forwards for node 8 and node 13 were 1 and
0 respectively in GPSR whereas in implementation of Sybil attack over GPSR it is
found to be increased by 1 for node 13 and decreased by 1 for node 8 respectively as
shown in figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Greedy forwards for Sybil attack over GPSR
Small amount of variations can also be seen in Figure 5.17 as well as Figure 5.18
.In figure 5.17 node 5, node 11 have 0 each as perimeter forwards whereas in GPSR
it has 1 as perimeter forward each for node 5, node 11. From figure 5.17 node 8 has
perimeter forward increased by 1 as compared to GPSR graph. Figure 5.18 tells us
that when Sybil attack is implemented in GPSR node 8 switches the data packets
from greedy to perimeter mode while in GPSR simulation node 11 switched the data
packets from greedy to perimeter mode in the path to the destination.
The Figure 5.19 shows that node 14 switches from perimeter to greedy mode and
the number of packets it switches is 1.0 which is almost half the number of packet
switched from perimeter to greedy mode by node 14 in GPSR.
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Figure 5.17: Perimeter forwards for Sybil attack over GPSR
Figure 5.18: Number of packet switched from greedy to perimeter mode for Sybil
attack over GPSR
Figure 5.19: Number of packet switched from perimeter to greedy mode for Sybil
attack over GPSR
CHAPTER 5. SIMULATION RESULTS 46
The number of packet dropped by each node is zero as it was in case of GPSR.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
GPSR was simulated for wireless sensor network and the packets were found to switch
from greedy mode to perimeter mode to encounter a void in the routing path.
Selective forwarding attack was simulated over GPSR and it was found that the
packets dropped for malicious node has increased as compared to that in GPSR. This
may lead to an event being unreported to base station.
Sybil attack was implemented and it was found that malicious node advertising
multiple geographic locations sends more number of beacons to their neighbours as in
comparison with GPSR , tends to alter the routes of packets and wastage of network
resources.
6.2 Future Work
We look forward to design and implement a cost effective defence against Selective
forwarding attack and Sybil attack over geographical routing protocol. The intended
defence should be such that it uses minimum of the network resources to minimize the
overhead. Our aim is to develop a countermeasure against these attacks by designing
an algorithm that helps us to estimate the presence or absence of malicious node in
an area of a network by using the current information about the network.
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